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Social essentialism, the belief that members of certain social categories share unobservable 
properties, licenses expectations that those categories are natural and a good basis for inference. 
A challenge for cognitive developmental theory is to give an account of how children come to 
develop essentialist beliefs about socially important categories. Previous evidence from Israel 
suggests that kindergarteners selectively engage in essentialist reasoning about culturally salient 
(ethnicity) categories, and that this is attenuated among children in integrated schools. In five 
studies (N=718) we used forced-choice (Study 1) and unconstrained (Studies 2-4) category-
based inference tasks, and a questionnaire (Study 5) to study the development of essentialist 
reasoning about religion categories in Northern Ireland (Studies 1-3 & 5) and the US (Study 4). 
Results show that, as in Israel, Northern Irish children selectively engage in essentialist 
reasoning about culturally salient (religion) categories, and that such reasoning is attenuated 
among children in integrated schools. However, the development trajectory of essentialist 
thinking and the patterns of attenuation among children attending integrated schools in Northern 
Ireland differ from the Israeli case. Meta-analysis confirmed this claim and ruled out an 
alternative explanation of the results based on community diversity. Although the Northern Irish 
and Israeli case studies illustrate that children develop selective essentialist beliefs about socially 
important categories, and that these beliefs are impacted by educational context, the differences 
between them emphasize the importance of historical, cultural, and political context in 
understanding conceptual development, and suggest that there may be more than one 
developmental route to social essentialism. 
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Development of essentialist thinking about religion categories in Northern Ireland  
(and the United States) 
Psychological essentialism is the belief that natural categories contain an underlying essence that 
conveys category membership and causes category members to share both observable and hidden 
properties (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989).  In some cases, essentialist thinking can be 
useful. For example, using “essentialized” categories for inference provides us with an important 
tool to reduce the complexity of incoming information to manageable levels, and allows us to 
organize what we know and make inferences about what we don’t know.  However, essentialist 
thinking can also be harmful and lead to overgeneralization or unwarranted assumptions of 
homogeneity, especially when essentialist thinking is applied to social categories (e.g. Bastian & 
Haslam, 2006; Diesendruck, 2013; Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer & Freeland, 2015). In this paper we 
examine the development of essentialist thinking about socially important religion categories—
Catholic and Protestant—in Northern Ireland, with particular attention toward how school and 
national context may contribute to differences in the use of social categories to guide inferences.  
Essentialist thinking about social categories in particular has been widely investigated 
(e.g., Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1996; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Rothbart & 
Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Corneille & Estrada, 2001), and there have been a variety of suggestions 
about its causes. One possibility is that it may represent an application of the same fundamental 
conceptual machinery that we use for thinking about natural kinds to the critical task of 
navigating our complex social environment (Gil-White, 2001). Another view is that a general 
purpose set of biases or heuristics results in the development of essentialist thinking about a 
variety of domains (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Gelman, 2003). Regardless of how it is 
Essentialist Thinking About Religion Categories  5 
 
 
explained, essentialist thinking about the social world can also lead us to weigh social category 
membership over individual qualities, making it one of several candidate causes (e.g. Sherif, 
Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961; Tajfel, 1982) of stereotyping, prejudice, and 
discrimination (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Diesendruck, 2013; Haslam, Bastian, Bain & Kashima, 
2006; Pauker, Ambady & Apfelbaum, 2010; Prentice & Miller, 2007). As a cognitive 
mechanism that may provide a foundation for stereotypical and prejudicial thinking, it is 
important to understand how social essentialism develops in different contexts. 
Although there is now quite a large literature on how the tendency to essentialise social 
categories develops, drawing firm conclusions from that literature is not straightforward. One 
difficulty lies in the range of categories and national contexts that have been studied. For 
example, ethno-religious categories are essentialized in Israel (see Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, 
Rhodes, Gelman & Neumark, 2013; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb & 
Diesendruck, 2015), social class categories are essentialized in India (Mahalingham, 2003) and 
race categories are essentialized in the US (Hirschfeld, 1996). Furthermore, a wide range of tasks 
has been used to study essentialism. Some researchers take children’s willingness to base 
inferences about novel behaviour on membership in social categories as evidence of essentialism 
(see Birnbaum, Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2010; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006), 
others have examined children’s beliefs about category stability over time (see Kinzler & Dautel, 
2012), and yet others study children’s beliefs about the degree to which categories are arbitrary 
and artificial versus objective and natural (see Diesndruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, et al.,  2013; Rhodes 
& Gelman, 2009).  
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Perhaps this wide variety of categories, and tasks used to study them, explains why there 
is evidence for early (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Byers-Heinlein & Garcia, 2014; Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; Kinsler & Dautel, 2012) and late (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009) 
emerging differences in levels of essentialist beliefs between different cultural and national 
groups, as well as why those differences  have been shown to come about via increases (see 
Birnbaum et al., 2010), decreases (Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2011) 
or increases and decreases (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009) in essentialist thinking about social 
categories amongst children exposed to particular contexts. Taken together, these studies present 
a suggestive but incomplete picture. Whereas the tendency to essentialise social categories 
appears to have been detected in every population studied, different social categories are 
essentialised at different times by different groups of children. Thus, it is hard to tell whether it is 
the nature of the categories or the nature of the context which is important. In order to draw 
general conclusions about how and why children display essentialist reasoning about social 
categories, detailed study of particular categories in particular national contexts is required. 
Ethnicity categories in Israel 
By far the most comprehensive case study in the literature has been provided by Diesendruck 
and his colleagues in their study of Israeli children’s essentialist beliefs about ethnic categories 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, Birnbaum, Deeb & Segall, 2013; 
Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; Diesendruck & HaLevei, 2006; Segall et al., 2015). In 
a series of important papers, it has been shown using a variety of experimental tasks and 
questionnaires, that Israeli children essentialise ethnicity categories from a young age. 
Diesendruck & HaLevi (2006) showed that secular Jewish kindergarteners preferred to make 
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social inferences based on membership of ethnicity (Arab, Jew) and social class categories rather 
than based on shared personality characteristics.  In a somewhat different task, Birnbaum et al. 
(2010) examined Israeli children’s willingness to base inferences about novel behaviour on 
competing cues related to membership in ethnicity categories, gender, religiosity, and social 
status. Religious Jewish children preferentially used ethnicity to guide inferences, and showed 
little change in this tendency between kindergarten and 6th grade. In contrast, secular Jewish 
children and Arab children showed no preference for any category. More recent work (Segall et 
al., 2015) suggests that parental use of generic terms (e.g. Jews, Arabs) to refer to social 
categories, is the strongest predictor of Israeli kindergarten children’s beliefs about the 
naturalness of ethnicity categories.  
Diesendruck and colleagues have also studied the effect of educational environment on 
essentialist beliefs about social categories in Israel. The context in which children grow up could 
be important for shaping essentialist thinking about social categories (e.g., Rhodes, 2013), and 
one contextual factor that is likely to have a large impact is the diversity of one’s immediate 
social environment. The effects of contact with members of diverse social groups on social 
cognition are well known (e.g., Allport, 1954; Crisp & Turner, 2011; Pettigrew, 1998), and 
indeed, Deeb et al. (2011) present evidence that children in diverse social environments may 
display lower levels of essentialist thinking as well. Specifically, Deeb et al. (2011) report that, 
based on the Essentialism Components Questionnaire (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009), Israeli 
Jewish and Arab children attending integrated schools were less likely to exhibit essentialist 
thinking about inheritance and psychological characteristics than children attending traditional 
schools. Older children in this study reported lower levels of essentialist beliefs than younger 
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children, but this drop in essentialist beliefs occurred earlier for Jewish children attending 
integrated schools. Thus, in Israel, a diverse educational environment appears to attenuate the 
relatively high levels of essentialist beliefs about ethnicity categories with which children appear 
to arrive at school.  
Further evidence that Israeli children may have strong essentialist beliefs about ethnicity, 
and other social categories, comes from a study (Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013) that 
examined the degree to which children in Israel and the US viewed race (Black, White) and 
ethnicity (Arab, Jewish) categories (along with gender, occupation, animal, and artefact 
categories) as arbitrary and artificial versus objective and natural. Results suggested that 
ethnicity was more highly essentialized for Israeli children than for US children; Israeli children 
were less willing to accept alternative categorization for ethnicity than any other kind of 
category, whereas ethnicity was less salient for US children. However, race was no more highly 
essentialized among US children than among Israeli children. And although they do not discuss 
it directly, the data reported by Diesendruck et al. hint at overall national differences in beliefs 
about the naturalness of social categories; the mean probability of rejecting an alternative 
category was 66% for Israeli children and only 52% for US children, suggesting that Israeli 
children may be more prone to essentialist thinking in general about social categories than US 
children. 
 Thus, the picture from Israel is one of (a) high levels of essentialist thinking about social 
categories in general and ethnicity categories specifically, (b) early emerging essentialism of 
ethnicity categories perhaps related to parental input, and (c) a general decrease in essentialist 
thinking with age, which occurs earlier amongst Jewish children attending integrated schools. 
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However, it’s not clear the degree to which these findings about ethnicity categories in Israel 
represent general developmental patterns or are specific to a given political, historical, and 
cultural context.  As such, it is important to carry out other case studies, on other social 
categories in other national contexts. To this end, we present an exploration of the development 
of essentialist thinking about religion categories (Catholic, Protestant) in Northern Ireland as 
another case study to complement the Israel one. Additionally, although effects of educational 
context on responses to questionnaires has been studied in Israel (see Deeb et al., 2011), to our 
knowledge there has been no study of the effects of educational diversity on experimental tasks 
typically used to measure essentialist thinking about social categories. Accordingly, we were 
particularly interested in the effects of educational diversity in Northern Ireland. 
The current study: Religion categories in Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland has long been the locus of ethno-political-religious conflict between 
Nationalists who favour unity with the Republic of Ireland (and tend to be Catholic and 
ethnically Irish) and Unionists who favour Northern Ireland remaining a part of the United 
Kingdom (and tend to be Protestant and ethnically English or Scottish). Although dating back 
centuries, this conflict was most recently manifest in “The Troubles,” a period from 1968 to 
1998 when thousands were killed and injured. As a result, religious affiliation—i.e., membership 
in the category Catholic or Protestant—remains a critically important social dimension in 
Northern Ireland today (see Gillespie, 2010) and Northern Irish society is subject to high levels 
of residential (see Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2009), marital (Lloyd & Robinson, 2011) and 
educational (see Gallagher, 2010) segregation on the basis of religious affiliation.  In contrast to 
Israel, large segregated population centers do not exist in Northern Ireland. Instead, the pattern is 
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one of micro-segregation such that in urban settings entirely Catholic neighborhoods can abut 
entirely Protestant ones (see Lloyd & Shuttleworth, 2012). Consistent with this pattern of 
segregation, there is evidence that children begin to internalize the ethnic-religious symbols and 
culture of their respective community from three years of age; by age six they already personally 
identify with their own community and show prejudice (Connolly, 2011; Connolly, Kelly & 
Smith, 2009; Connolly, Smith & Kelly, 2002).  
Like Israel, there are integrated and segregated schools in Northern Ireland. The vast 
majority of children in Northern Ireland attend either State “controlled” schools which are run by 
the Department of Education Northern Ireland, have formal links to Protestant denominations, 
and average fewer than 5% Catholic students, or Catholic “maintained” schools which are 
overseen by a separate body and average less than 1% Protestant students (Northern Ireland 
Council for Integrated Education, 2007). Although both controlled (Protestant) and Catholic 
maintained schools provide homogenous ethno-religious environments via de facto segregation 
by religion, there are also integrated schools in Northern Ireland explicitly established to 
introduce peace education and teach children to respect and value diversity in others by bringing 
together Catholic and Protestant children. At present only about 5% of both nursery and primary 
schools in Northern Ireland are integrated (Department of Education, Northern Ireland, 2015; for 
reviews see, Gallagher, 2010; Hewstone et al, 2005).  
In the following five studies (along with a meta-analysis), we examine the development 
of essentialist thinking about social categories in Northern Ireland. In our first study, we use a 
forced-choice inference task based on that used by Birnbaum et al. (2010) to examine the relative 
potency of a culturally salient social dimension (religion) in guiding inferences about unfamiliar 
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properties. In the inference task participants learn that an individual, distinguished by its 
membership of two social categories, possesses a property, and are presented with two further 
individuals each sharing with the base membership of just one social category. Participants must 
decide which of the target individuals is most likely to also possess the property. To the extent 
that participants view the property to be projectible (see Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson & Kunda, 1983), 
their decisions provide an indication of their beliefs about category coherence. That is, 
projectible properties are more likely to be shared by members of coherent categories, and the 
belief that category members cohere is an important aspect of essentialism (see Gelman, 2003).   
We address the question developmentally by testing 6, 8, and 10-year-old children. Based on 
Connolly’s (1999) findings, we estimated that six years is the youngest age at which children in 
Northern Ireland might possess knowledge of religion categories. Furthermore, the period from 
6-11 years is a time previously shown to be associated with important change in children’s 
beliefs and reasoning about social categories (e.g. see Deeb et al., 2011; Taylor, Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009).  
We address questions of the diversity of the educational environment by comparing 
category-based social inference among children in religiously integrated schools with those in 
religiously segregated schools. In Studies 2 and 3 we used a modified methodology to compare 
absolute levels of social inference amongst children attending segregated and integrated schools 
in Northern Ireland. In Study 4 we used the same method to examine whether the pattern we had 
observed was specific to Northern Ireland, or whether it also held in a group of children from the 
US. In Study 5 we used a completely different measure—the Essentialism Components 
Questionnaire (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009)—to examine whether the pattern observed in 
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Northern Irish children’s inferences about social categories was an artefact of the category-based 
inference measures used in Studies 1-4. And finally, we present a meta-analysis of our findings 
and address relations between neighborhood diversity and patterns of essentialist thinking about 
religion categories. 
In all of the studies to be described here we asked children about three different social 
dimensions: religion, gender and pet ownership. The last dimension was included as a control; 
we expected that children would display more essentialist reasoning (Studies 1-4) and stronger 
essentialist beliefs (Study 5) about gender (boy vs. girl) and religion (Catholic vs. Protestant) 
categories than about control (hamster owners vs. goldfish owners) categories. Based on the 
Israeli results, we predicted that children from Northern Ireland will make more inferences based 
on religion category membership than based on membership of other social categories. 
Furthermore, if the Northern Irish case is like the Israeli one, then we should observe essentialist 
reasoning and beliefs about religion categories amongst the youngest children in our studies, and 
the effect of attending an integrated school should be to attenuate relatively high and early 
emerging levels of essentialist reasoning.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 174 children, aged 6-11 years, recruited from State 
controlled (Protestant), Catholic maintained and Integrated schools in Northern Ireland.  As may 
be seen in Table 1 where we present demographic information about our sample, Ns for each age 
group in each school type varied between 17 and 20. These Ns are comparable to those in 
previous developmental studies of social inference (e.g. Birnbaum et al., 2010). 
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Materials and Design. Children were presented with a forced choice inference task 
(similar to that used by Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006 and by Birnbaum et al., 2010), in which 
they had to choose between two competing categories as a basis for inference. We focused on 
two contrasting categories within each of three focal social dimensions. The primary dimension 
of interest was religion, and the categories were Catholic and Protestant, chosen because of their 
cultural, political and historical salience in Northern Ireland. We also asked about gender 
(boy/girl) as another social dimension for which categories were likely to have inductive 
potential. Finally, we utilized the dimension of pet ownership (goldfish/hamster owner) as 
control categories which we deemed unlikely to support inductive generalizations. By comparing 
inferences based on potentially meaningful categories of religion and gender to inferences based 
on these less meaningful categories, we can distinguish between targeted beliefs that specific 
categories conveyed inductive potential, and more generic beliefs about the inductive potential of 
(potentially novel) social categories. 
 Each participant was presented with 12 triads of pictures. Each triad consisted of two 
base pictures and one target. The base pictures had explicit values on two of the three focal social 
dimensions: religion (Catholic/Protestant), gender (girl/boy), and pet ownership 
(goldfish/hamster), and contrasted on two of these dimensions (e.g., a Catholic boy and a 
Protestant girl). The target matched each base picture on one of the two dimensions (e.g., a 
Catholic girl). Each pairwise combination of social dimensions (religion-gender, religion-pet 
ownership, gender-pet ownership) was tested with four triads that utilized every combination of 
values on the two dimensions as targets.   
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Stimuli were 36 hand-drawn pictures of children. Religion and pet ownership were 
conveyed by verbal descriptions alone; the descriptions conveying religion category membership 
were “goes to a {Catholic/Protestant} church” and conveying pet ownership category 
membership were “owns a {goldfish /hamster}.” Gender category membership was depicted 
visually based on clothing and hairstyle as well as labels, and conveyed via the labels boy and 
girl. All children were depicted on similar neutral backgrounds. In triads where the contrasting 
categories were religion and pet, gender was kept constant. Here and throughout, we chose to 
convey category membership for religion and pet ownership categories through descriptions 
rather than labels in order to make the categories as accessible as possible to our youngest 
participants. Descriptions specify the relevant social dimension (e.g., “goes to X church” is a 
religious affiliation) in a way that labels (“is an X” is potentially ambiguous) may not. 
As is common in the adult literature on category-based induction (see Feeney, Coley & 
Crisp, 2010), we used entirely blank properties in order to ensure that any effects we observed 
were due to participants’ beliefs about the categories in the experiment, rather than the framing 
of the property. In the adult literature, alphanumeric symbols are often used to refer to properties 
(e.g. property X15). As this was deemed inappropriate for the age range studied here, we instead 
used a different novel attribute (e.g., is noxy, is flirst) for each triad. The order of presentation of 
each set of triads and the novel attributes used were counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure. All participants had written parental consent and were tested individually in a 
quiet area of their school.  They were told that we were interested in how children think about 
others and that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions that they would be asked.  
Children were then presented with the 12 triads.  For an example of a triad contrasting religion 
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and control category membership, see Figure 1.  As Figure 1 illustrates, children were presented 
with three pictures – two base pictures and one target picture.  When presented with the first base 
picture the experimenter said (using Figure 1 as an example) “Look at this child here.  This child 
goes to a Catholic church and owns a hamster.  This child is flirst.”  The second base picture was 
presented and the experimenter said “Look at this child here.  This child goes to a Protestant 
church and owns a goldfish.  This child is legan.”  The target was then presented and the 
experimenter said “Look at this child here.  This child goes to a Catholic church like this child 
(the experimenter points to the first base picture) and owns a goldfish like this child (point to the 
second base picture).  Do you think this child (points at the target) is flirst like this child (points 
to base picture 1) or legan like this one (points to base picture 2)?”  Thus, children were asked to 
choose between shared membership in the same religion category and shared membership in the 
same control category when deciding which novel inference to draw.  There were no children 
who were unwilling to make an inference at any point during the task.  A score of 1 was given to 
the category that children based an inference on and a score of 0 was given to the category that 
children chose not to base an inference on.  In addition to the counterbalancing of triads and 
properties across participants, the order of verbally presenting each of the two categories in each 
picture was also counterbalanced.    
Results 
Scoring. Each child attempted 12 experimental trials and had eight opportunities to make 
an inference based on each of the three social dimensions used in the experiment. Four of the 12 
trials required them to choose between each combination of the social dimensions used in the 
experiment. For each combination of dimensions we calculated a score out of four to assess the 
Essentialist Thinking About Religion Categories  16 
 
 
degree to which participants preferred to make inferences on the basis of one or other of the 
dimensions. Because of our focus on inferences based on religion categories, we also calculated 
a score for each participant corresponding to the total number of religion-based inferences on all 
trials involving religion (i.e., religion-gender and religion-pet trials), ranging from 0-8.  
Relative Importance of Each Social Dimension. To examine whether participants 
regarded certain social dimensions as a more useful basis for inference than others, we compared 
mean responses to chance (50%) for each dimensional pair, both overall and broken down by age 
and school type. Results are presented in Figure 2.  
Religion versus Control. Overall, children made more inferences based on religion than 
based on pet ownership (M = 2.33 religion-based inferences, SD = 1.31), t(173)  = 3.35, p = .001, 
Cohen’s d = .25. As depicted in Figure 2A, among children attending State Controlled 
(Protestant) schools, 6-year-olds did not differ from chance, whereas 8- and 10-year-olds both 
based inferences on religion categories more often than expected by chance (t(19)=2.60, 
p=0.018, d=.58 and t(19)=2.41, p=0.027, d=.54, respectively). Likewise, for children attending 
Catholic maintained schools, 6-year-olds were at chance, whereas 8-year-olds showed a 
significant preference for religion-based inferences, t(19)=2.89, p=0.009, d=.65. Although in the 
same direction, the difference did not reach significance for 10-year-olds attending Catholic 
maintained schools, t(16)=1.10, p=0.288, d=0.2. In contrast, none of the age groups of children 
attending integrated schools preferred religion-based inferences over those based on pet 
ownership. In sum, a preference for basing inferences on religion over control categories seems 
to emerge around age 8, and only among children attending religiously segregated schools. 
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Religion versus Gender. Overall, children made more inferences based on religion than 
based on gender, M = 2.60, SD = 1.28, t(173) = 6.24, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.47. As depicted in 
Figure 2B, the developmental patterns were very similar to those for religion versus control 
inferences. Specifically, among children attending State Controlled schools, 6-year-olds did not 
differ from chance, whereas 8-year-olds showed a significant preference for religion-based 
inferences over gender-based inferences, t(19)=4.22, p<0.001, d=.94. Although in the same 
direction, the difference did not reach significance for 10-year-olds attending State Controlled 
schools, t(19)=1.69, p=0.107, d=0.38. For children attending Catholic maintained schools, 6-
year-olds were at chance, whereas 8- and 10-year-olds both based inferences on religion 
categories more often than expected by chance (t(19)=3.33, p=0.004, d=.74, and t(16)=4.76, 
p<0.001, d=1.15, respectively). Among children attending integrated schools, neither the 6-year-
olds nor the 10-year-olds differed from chance, although 8-year-olds showed a significant 
preference for inferences based on religion over gender, t(19) = 2.11, p = 0.049, d = 0.47. In 
sum, a preference for basing inferences on religion over gender categories seems to emerge 
around age 8, and was most evident among children attending religiously segregated schools. 
Gender versus Control. Overall, to our surprise, children were no more likely to base 
inferences on gender than on pet ownership, M = 1.87, SD = 1.31, t(173) = 1.27, p = 0.205, d = 
.10. As is evidenced in Figure 2C, no subgroup differed from chance on these items.  
Effects of Age and Educational Context on Religion-Based Inferences. Because 
religion was our focal dimension, we conducted an additional factorial ANOVA to examine the 
effect of educational context (State controlled, Catholic maintained, and Integrated schools), and 
age group (6-7 years, 8-9 years and 10-11 years) on children’s religion based inferences across 
Essentialist Thinking About Religion Categories  18 
 
 
both types of trials (for a total of 8) that involved religion (see Figure 3). We also compared 
means to chance (4 out of 8 responses.) We observed a significant main effect of age group on 
children’s tendency to make inferences based on shared religion category membership, F(2, 165) 
= 5.38, p < .01, η2partial=0.06. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that 8-year-
olds made significantly more inferences based on religion than did 6-year-olds, whereas 10-year-
olds did not differ from either group. Neither the effect of educational context, F(2, 165) = 1.52, 
p > .2, η2partial  =  0.02, nor its interaction with age group, F(4, 165) = .9, p > .45, η2partial=0.02, 
were significant. However, when compared to chance performance (see Figure 3), religion-based 
inferences exceeded chance levels among 8- and 10-year-olds attending segregated schools (8-
year-olds: t ≥ 4.34, p <.001, d ≥ .97; 10-year-olds: t ≥ 2.70, p < .02, d ≥ .66), but never did so for 
children attending integrated schools. Taken together, these results suggest that a preference for 
basing inferences on religion categories emerges around age 8, and only among children 
attending religiously segregated schools. 
Discussion 
Overall, the children in this study made more inferences based on religion category 
membership than on gender or control category memberships, and this preference for religion-
based inferences emerged with development. Whereas the youngest children did not distinguish 
between the categories in terms of their inductive potential, by eight years of age religion as 
more informative than gender or pet ownership for the purposes of inference. This is consistent 
with the view that religion categories become increasingly essentialized among Northern Irish 
children, and suggests that essentialist beliefs about religion categories may emerge later in 
Essentialist Thinking About Religion Categories  19 
 
 
Northern Ireland than do essentialist beliefs about ethnicity categories amongst Israeli children 
(see Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006). 
 The results also suggest that Northern Irish children’s emerging essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories may be associated with educational context. Although the ANOVA did not 
show significant effects of school context, comparisons to chance showed that, amongst children 
attending integrated schools, religion categories are not used as a basis for inference more than 
would be expected by chance, and are no more inductively potent than arbitrary control 
categories. However, for children attending segregated schools, more inferences are based on 
religion category membership than would be expected by chance from 8 years of age, and by 8 
years of age, religion categories are seen as more inductively compelling than control categories, 
or gender categories. Thus, these findings are broadly consistent with previous findings that 
educational context is associated with essentialist beliefs about culturally salient social categories 
(see Deeb et al. 2011). However, the developmental timing and direction of the effects suggests 
that in Northern Ireland, segregated educational contexts may be associated with an increase in 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories over time, rather than, as has been found elsewhere, 
integrated contexts being associated with a decrease in essentialist beliefs. We cannot at present 
make causal claims about the role of educational context in the emergence of essentialist 
thinking; in the General Discussion we will consider constraints on how these associations with 
school context may be interpreted. 
Surprisingly, children based inferences on gender at chance levels (although this finding 
is not without precedent; see Diesendruck and HaLevi, 2006; Taylor & Gelman, 1993). Coupled 
with evidence that children perceive gender categories to be highly natural (i.e., immutable and 
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non-arbitrary, e.g., Taylor, 1996; Taylor, Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), these findings may align 
with Haslam et al.’s (2000) analysis of social essentialism into components of naturalness and 
cohesiveness. Perhaps children’s extensive experience with diverse members of gender 
categories means that although they believe them to be natural, they perceive them to lack 
cohesion, and thus to provide a relatively weak basis for inference. We return to this point in 
Study 5. 
Overall,  these results provide a basis of comparison for earlier work by Diesendruck and 
colleagues in Israel (e.g. Birnbaum et al., 2010), and show that when forced to choose, children 
in Northern Ireland prefer to draw inferences on the basis of religion over gender or control 
categories. They also suggest that in Northern Ireland the emergence of religion as a privileged 
category for social inference may be especially pronounced among children attending segregated 
schools. However, because the task involved a forced choice, we cannot draw inferences from 
these data about absolute levels of inductive potential afforded by religion categories. In the next 
study, we introduce a slightly modified task which allows us to do so. 
Study 2 
As noted above, in a forced choice paradigm like that used in Study 1 (and by Birnbaum 
et al., 2010; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006, and others), participants’ responses are taken to 
indicate which category is considered more inductively potent. One drawback of this 
methodology is that it cannot measure absolute levels of inference; by constraining the number of 
inferences children can make, it becomes insensitive to the possibility that both—or neither—of 
the categories might be seen as inductively potent. To replicate and generalize the findings of 
Study 1 with a less constrained task, we taught children a novel property about an exemplar (a 
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hypothetical child said to belong to two social categories, e.g. Catholic boy), and then 
individually presented targets that shared both, one, or neither category (another Catholic boy, a 
Catholic girl, a Protestant boy, a Protestant girl) and asked whether each target would share the 
property. Because this allowed us to assess absolute levels of inference as well as independently 
assessing the contributions of different social categories, it permitted us to test for general 
changes in levels of social essentialism as well as for variations in essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories specifically. Differences between socially relevant categories and the control 
category are particularly important with this method which does not require participants to 
choose between the different social categories as a basis for inference. Thus, observing 
significant differences between, for example, inferences based on religion versus pet ownership 
is good evidence that those inferences are based on specific beliefs about religion categories 
rather than some more generic beliefs  about the inductive potential of (possibly novel) 
categories. 
Method 
Participants. 165 children, drawn from Catholic maintained, State controlled (Protestant) 
and Integrated primary schools in Northern Ireland, participated in this study. Table 2 provides a 
detailed breakdown of numbers, age and religious affiliation for each group.  
Materials and Design. We used the same categories in this study as in Study 1, but 
modified the task, as described above. Each participant was presented with three sets of pictures. 
Each set contained a base and four targets. The base had explicit values on two of the three focal 
social dimensions: religion (Catholic/Protestant), gender (girl/boy), and pet ownership 
(goldfish/hamster owner). The corresponding targets represented all possible combinations of the 
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two dimensions. For example (see Figure 4), the religion/gender set involved one trial for which 
the base and target belonged to the same religion and gender categories (R+/G+), one trial for 
which they shared religion but differed in gender (R+/G-), one in which they shared gender but 
differed in religion (R-/G+), and one in which they came from different religion and gender 
categories (R-/G-). The category membership of the base was counterbalanced, so the specific 
role assigned to each target varied accordingly. For instance, the target described as a girl who 
goes to Catholic church was considered R+/G- for participants presented with a Catholic boy as a 
base, but R-/G+ for those who were presented with a Protestant girl as a base. 
Stimuli were 15 hand-drawn pictures. In this study, as in Study 1, religion and pet 
ownership category memberships were conveyed by behavioral descriptions only. Accordingly, 
the five pictures which were used for the religion/pet ownership trials depicted androgynous 
silhouettes.  Gender category membership was depicted visually as well as with a label, and the 
remaining 10 pictures represented boys or girls (based on clothing and hairstyle). 
Procedure. Each child was tested individually for 5-10 minutes in a quiet corner of their 
school and had full parental consent to participate. Each child was told that they would be shown 
pictures of children and asked a question about each picture. For each set of categories, the 
experimenter showed the base picture and verbally presented the appropriate category 
information, as well as the novel property (gleeve, sproice or chaunch). For example, for the 
religion/gender set, children might be shown a picture of a girl and told, “Look at this child. This 
child is a girl and goes to a Catholic church. This child is gleeve.” With the base picture visible, 
children were then shown each target picture in turn. For each target, the experimenter verbally 
presented the appropriate category information, and asked whether or not the target would share a 
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novel property with the base. For example, children might then be shown a picture of a different 
girl and told, “Now, look at this child. This child is a girl and goes to a Protestant church. Do you 
think this child is gleeve like this child (referring to the base)?” For trials involving pet 
ownership, the child was said to “have a pet goldfish/hamster.” Children responded “yes” or “no” 
for each target. The same unfamiliar property was used for all four inferences in each set of trials. 
Order of presentation of the three sets and the four targets within each set was counterbalanced.  
Results 
Scoring. Each child saw 4 base-target pairs that matched on each social category. To 
measure the degree to which each social category promoted inductive generalization, we 
calculated 3 scores for each participant, corresponding to the number of times the target was said 
to share the property with the base (ranging from 0-4) for each type of social category (religion, 
gender, control). For example, the religion score was the number of positive inferences for the 
R+/P+, R+/P-, R+/G+, and R+/G- items.  
Overall Analysis of Social Inference. To examine patterns of social inference, we 
conducted a 3 (Social Dimension: religion, gender, pet) x 3 (School Group: Catholic maintained, 
State controlled, integrated) x 3 (Age Group: 6-7, 8-9, and 10-11 year olds) mixed ANOVA on 
mean inferences to matching targets. Overall, children based more inferences on religion 
(M=2.60) and the control category (M=2.41) than based on gender (M=2.04), F(2,312)=22.43, 
p<0.001, η2partial =0.13; Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed the differences 
between gender and the other two categories to be statistically significant (p < .001), whereas 
overall inferences based on religion did not differ from those based on the control category. 
This was qualified by a significant interaction between social dimension and school, 
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F(4,312)=2.66, p=0.033, η2partial=0.03, depicted in Figure 5. To explore this interaction we 
carried out three one-way ANOVAs comparing children’s use of religion, pet, and gender 
categories to guide inferences separately for each type of school. Children in Catholic maintained 
and state controlled schools showed similar patterns of inference; for both groups, inferences 
based on religion and control categories were more frequent than those based on gender 
(Catholic maintained: F(2, 106) = 11.17, p<.001, η2partial =0.17; state controlled: F(2, 110) = 
14.68, p < .001, η2partial =0.21, Bonferroni-corrected p < .001), whereas inferences based on 
religion did not differ from those based on control categories. In contrast, inferences for children 
attending integrated schools did not differ by social dimension, F(2, 108) = 1.68, p=.19, η2partial 
=0.03.  
The results of the omnibus ANOVA also revealed a marginally significant interaction 
between category and age, F(4, 312) = 2.09, p = .08, η2partial =0.03, depicted in Figure 6. To 
explore this interaction we carried out three one-way ANOVAs comparing children’s use of 
religion, pet, and gender categories to guide inferences separately for each age group. These 
revealed that 6- and 8-year-olds made more inferences based on religion and control category 
memberships than based on gender (6-year-olds: F(2, 104) = 7.29, p=.001, η2partial =0.12; 8-year-
olds: F(2, 118) = 12.33, p < .001, η2partial =0.17; Bonferroni-corrected ps < .005). For both groups, 
inferences based on religion did not differ from those based on control categories. In contrast, the 
pattern for 10-year-old children was quite different; these children made significantly more 
inferences based on religion than on either of the other categories, F(2, 102) = 7.11, p=.001, 
η2partial =0.12, Bonferroni-corrected p<.05. For 10-year-olds, inferences based on gender did not 
differ from those based on control category membership. 
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Religion-based inferences. Although the omnibus 3-way interaction was not significant 
(F(8,312) = 1.00, p=.434, η2partial =0.02), we conducted exploratory analyses to examine our focal 
question about the emergence of religion categories as  privileged guide for social inferences. 
Specifically, we compared religion-based inferences to control (pet ownership-based) inferences 
for each age/school group via t-test. Difference scores are depicted in Figure 7 (positive scores 
represent more inferences to religion matches than control matches). Results suggest that 
religion-based inferences exceeded control inferences for 8-year-olds in state controlled schools 
(t(20)=2.55, p=0.019, d=1.14) and for 10-year-olds in Catholic maintained schools (t(17)=2.56, 
p=0.020, d=1.24). Religion-based inferences never exceed control inferences among children in 
integrated schools. 
Discussion 
The results of this study suggest that in the absence of a forced choice, Northern Irish 
children’s preferences for religion-based inferences are still late-emerging and influenced by 
school context. Specifically, results suggest that preference for religion-based inferences over 
control inferences was only observed among 10-year-olds, but not among 8- or 6-year-olds. 
Likewise, results suggest that preference for religion-based inferences over control inferences 
were only observed among children in segregated schools (10-year-olds in Catholic maintained 
schools, and 8-year-olds in state controlled schools) but not for children in integrated schools, 
who showed no differential use of religion, gender, or pet ownership to guide inferences. These 
results add weight to the possibility, suggested by Study 1, that children in Northern Ireland do 
not develop essentialist beliefs about religion categories until considerably later than had been 
suggested by results from the Israeli case study of ethnicity categories, and that attendance at a 
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segregated school may be associated with an emerging preference for religion-based inferences. 
The results of Studies 2 were somewhat weaker than those of Study 1, and suggest 
somewhat different conclusions about the age at which essentialist reasoning about religion 
categories emerges in Northern Ireland. In Study 1, religion emerged as a privileged basis for 
inferences around age 8, whereas in Study 2 we did not observe a significant difference between 
religion- and control-based inferences until age 10. For these reasons, we decided to repeat Study 
2, making a change to the materials. We reasoned that the absence of visual cues to religion and 
pet ownership categories may have taxed the working memory resources of younger participants, 
thus leading them to fail to distinguish between these categories in terms of inductive potency. 
Accordingly in Study 3 all social dimensions were represented visually as well as with behavioral 
descriptions (religion and control) and verbal labels (gender).  
Study 3 
The aim of Study 3 was to establish whether Northern Irish children begin to treat religion 
category membership as a particularly informative basis for social inference at eight years of age 
(as suggested by the results of Study 1) or ten years of age (as suggested by Study 2). We used 
the same basic method as in Study 2 but, in order to make the task cognitively less demanding 
for participants, in Study 3 we included visual cues to category membership. We hypothesized 
that this might lead to participants distinguishing religion and control categories earlier than was 
observed in Study 2. 




Participants. A total of 228 Northern Irish children, drawn from Catholic maintained, 
State controlled (Protestant), and integrated schools participated in this study. Table 3 provides a 
detailed breakdown of numbers, age and religious affiliation for each group.  
Materials and Procedure. We used materials similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2. 
However, in this study, category membership was conveyed by verbal labels and by pictorial 
representations: for religion, one of two visually distinct churches was depicted in the 
background, for gender, the child was depicted as a boy or a girl (based on clothing and 
hairstyle), and for pet ownership, a drawing of a hamster or goldfish was presented next to the 
depicted child (see Figure 8). For religion/pet trials (i.e., those for which no gender value was 
specified), we used androgynous silhouettes to depict the base and target children. The procedure 
was identical to that used in Study 2. 
Results 
Scoring. As in Study 2, each child saw 4 base-target pairs that matched on each social 
category. To measure the degree to which each social category promoted inductive 
generalization, we calculated 3 scores for each participant, corresponding to the number of times 
the target was said to share the property with the base (ranging from 0-4) for each type of social 
category (religion, gender, control).  
Overall Analysis of Social Inference. To examine patterns of social inference, we 
conducted a 3 (Social Dimension: religion, gender, pet) x 3 (School Group: Catholic maintained, 
State controlled, integrated) x 3 (Age Group: 6-7, 8-9, and 10-11 year olds) mixed ANOVA on 
mean inferences to matching targets. Overall, as in Study 2, children made more inferences based 
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on religion (M=2.81) and the control category (M=2.46), than on gender (M=2.06), F(1.9, 
411.9)=55.07, p<0.001, η2partial =0.20; unlike in Study 2, overall inferences to religion categories 
were higher than those to control categories (all differences significant at p<0.01 via Bonferroni-
adjusted t-test).  
This was qualified by a marginal interaction between Category and Age Group, F(3.8, 
411.9)=2.36, p=0.06, η2partial=0.02 (shown in Figure 9). To explore this interaction we again 
carried out three one-way ANOVAs comparing children’s use of religion, pet, and gender 
categories to guide inferences separately for each age group. Results suggest that each age group 
presented a unique profile regarding differences among specific social dimensions. For 6-year-
olds, inferences based on religion and control categories were equivalent, and more frequent than 
inferences based on gender (F(2,144)=31.44, p<0.001, η2partial=0.30,  p<0.001 via Bonferroni-
corrected t-tests). Eight-year-olds made more inferences based on religion than based on the 
control categories, which in turn were more frequent than those based on gender 
(F(2,154)=21.52, p<0.001, η2partial=0.22,  p<0.05 via Bonferroni-corrected t-tests). Finally, for 10-
year-olds, inferences based on religion were more frequent than inferences based on control 
categories or gender, which did not differ (F(2,152)=11.91, p<0.001, η2partial=0.14,  p<0.02 via 
Bonferroni-corrected t-tests). There were no significant effects involving educational context, and 
the three-way interaction was also not significant. 
Discussion  
Overall, participants in this study based more inferences on religion category membership 
than membership in other social categories. Thus, we have replicated the central finding of Study 
1, that children in Northern Ireland view religion categories as a strong basis for social inference. 
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Furthermore, just as in Study 1, 6-year-olds did not distinguish between the inductive potential of 
religion and control categories, whereas 8-year-olds did so. In other words, religion categories did 
not become a uniquely important basis for social inference until eight years of age. This suggests 
that the finding in Study 2, that children did not distinguish between religion and control 
categories as bases for inference until 10 years of age, may have been due to the absence of visual 
cues in that study making the task more demanding on memory. However, because we did not 
experimentally manipulate this aspect of our materials, this is a speculative interpretation. 
Interestingly, even the addition of visual cues in this study did not lead to 6-7 year olds 
distinguishing between the categories. Thus, the results of this study, along with the results of 
Study 1, suggest that in contrast to Israel where children appear to arrive at school with 
essentialist beliefs about ethnic categories, children in Northern Ireland do not develop such 
beliefs about religion categories until eight years of age.  
In contrast to the results of Studies 1 and 2, the results of this study show no clear 
differences between children attending integrated schools in Northern Ireland and those attending 
segregated schools. Both make more inferences based on religion category membership than 
based on gender or membership in a control category. We return to this issue in the General 
Discussion. 
Study 4 
Studies 1-3 present clear evidence that by age 8, children in Northern Ireland come to 
essentialize religion categories to a greater degree than gender or control categories. Although 
the historical and cultural significance of the categories Catholic and Protestant in Northern 
Ireland is undisputed, this developmental pattern may be specific to the historical factors that 
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have shaped Northern Ireland culture, or alternatively may represent a more general tendency to 
essentialize religion categories. To begin to distinguish between these possibilities, we examined 
whether the pattern of development we see in Studies 1-3 is specific to Northern Ireland, by 
testing a comparison group of children from the greater Boston area in the US. We chose to 
recruit a sample in Boston because of the geographical distance and the cultural similarities. 
People in the Boston area share close linguistic, cultural and even family linkages to Northern 
Ireland, and thus in many respects the two areas are culturally very similar, and thus comparable 
in many ways. In particular, the largest religious group in both places is Catholic; c. 29% of 
people declare themselves Catholic in Boston (Pew Research Centre, 2014), versus c. 41% in NI 
(Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2014).  However, the geographical distance 
and lack of conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the US means that children in Boston 
are less likely to be affected by the historical-cultural conflict specific to Northern Ireland than 
children in, say, Great Britain or the Republic of Ireland. Therefore, if the historical-cultural-
context specific to Northern Ireland is driving the pattern of emergence of essentialist thinking 
about social categories we observe there, then the categories Catholic and Protestant, although 
present and familiar to most Americans, may be less salient—and perhaps less essentialized—
than they are in Northern Ireland.  
Method 
Participants. A total of 67 children, drawn from public schools in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, USA, participated in this study. Thirty of these children were aged 6-7 years, 28 
were aged 8-9 years and 23 were aged 10-12 years. Twenty nine percent of the sample was 
Catholic, 12% Protestant, 5% other or mixed and the remaining 53% were not religious. With 
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respect to race and ethnicity, the communities from which the sample was drawn averaged 90% 
European American, 2% African American, 5% Asian American, and 4% Latino, according to 
2010 US Census figures. These categories are more varied than those which characterize the 
samples from Northern Ireland, which were close to 100% Caucasian Europeans. 
Materials and Procedure. With one exception, the materials were identical to those used 
in Study 3 where participants received both pictorial and verbal cues for each category they were 
presented with. Because we had identified religion and pet ownership category memberships 
using verbal cues only in Studies 1 and 2, but using verbal and pictorial cues in Study 3, half of 
the participants in Study 4 received pictorial plus verbal cues, and half received verbal cues for 
all three dimensions but pictorial cues for gender only (i.e., religion and pet ownership were 
described but not pictured). This was done to test whether responses were influenced by the 
presence of the pictorial representations of religion and pet categories1. In all other respects the 
procedure and data scoring was as described for Study 3. 
Results and Discussion 
Mean rates of inference for US children, broken down by age and social dimension, are 
presented in Table 4. We computed mean scores for inferences based on religion, gender, and 
control categories as described for Studies 2 and 3, and conducted a 3 (Age Group) x 3 (Social 
Dimension) mixed ANOVA. Overall, inferences to religion and control categories were higher 
than those to gender categories, but did not differ from each other, F(2, 128)=9.62, p<.001, 
η2partial=0.13, Bonferroni corrected t-test ps <0.005. Although no other effects were significant, 
comparisons to chance performance (see Table 4) revealed that inferences based on religion and 
                                                          
1 Analysis of this manipulation revealed no effect of materials so, for the purposes of subsequent 
statistical analysis, we ignored this variable. 
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control category membership were above chance for 6-year-olds, marginally above chance for 8-
year-olds, and did not differ from chance for 10-year-olds. Gender-based inferences never 
differed from chance levels. 
Although this is a preliminary foray into cross-national comparisons of reasoning about 
religion categories, based on qualitative comparison the US children in this study differ markedly 
from children in Northern Ireland in several ways. First, children in the Boston area never drew 
inferences based on religion at levels that exceeded the control category, whereas children in 
Northern Ireland did so by age 8 (Studies 1 and 3) or 10 (Study 2). Second, only 6-year-olds, but 
not 8- or 10-year-olds, drew inferences based on any social category at above-chance levels, 
whereas in Northern Ireland, the developmental trajectory was reversed, from chance levels 
around age 6 to above-chance levels among older children. Moreover, the differences were 
specific to the salience of religion categories; inferences based on gender were similarly rejected 
by children on both sides of the Atlantic. These results suggest that the pattern we have observed 
in Northern Irish children’s reasoning about religion categories is not universal, but instead is 
likely related to historical and cultural factors specific to Northern Irish society.  
An alternative explanation for the different patterns in the US and Northern Ireland is that 
US children simply lack familiarity with the labels Catholic and Protestant. Although we are 
aware of no data directly investigating the familiarity of religion category labels to US children, 
previous work suggests that children in Northern Ireland identify with their ethnic-religious 
category by age six (see Connolly, 2011), and that US participants retrospectively report 
acquiring the term Catholic at 7-8 years of age (Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Brysbaert, 
2012). As such, it seems unlikely that our 10-year-old US participants--who showed no evidence 
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of a preference for inferences based on religion category membership--are completely unfamiliar 
with these labels. Nevertheless, until familiarity data are collected, the possibility remains that the 
difference between children in Northern Ireland and the US may be due to relative familiarity 
with the category labels, rather than differences in essentialist thinking about religion categories.  
Study 5 
The results of Studies 1-4 are remarkably coherent and suggest that essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories emerge relatively late in Northern Ireland, and are more likely to be observed 
amongst children attending segregated rather than integrated schools. As discussed above, this 
pattern is somewhat different from that described by other researchers (e.g., Diesendruck and 
colleagues). These differences may reflect contextual and cultural differences in the 
manifestation of essentialist thinking about social categories. However, the different findings 
may also stem from methodological differences. For example, whereas Diesendruck and 
colleagues asked participants to reason about specific novel properties (e.g. “likes to play zigo”), 
we asked children to reason about properties presented as adjectives (e.g. “is legan”). As such, 
one possibility is that essentialist reasoning in our study showed a different developmental 
pattern because younger children may not have taken the adjectives to indicate projectible 
properties. Although we think this is unlikely given the willingness of 6-year-olds in the US to 
draw inferences about identical properties, and moreover, this methodological difference doesn't 
explain the school- or dimension-based differences among older children, it is nevertheless a 
systematic methodological difference that warrants attention. 
In addition, whereas Diesendruck and colleagues always conveyed social category 
membership via labels (e.g., “this child is a boy”), we used behavioral descriptions for religion 
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and pet categories (e.g. “this child goes to a Catholic church”), and used category labels for 
gender categories only. As such, one possible explanation for the late emergence of essentialist 
thinking about religion categories in our study is that membership in religion and pet categories 
had to be inferred from behavioral descriptions. In other words, conveying category membership 
via descriptions rather than labels may underestimate the inductive power of these categories for 
younger children (see Gelman, Collman & Maccoby, 1986). Importantly, this possibility is 
weakened by the observation that gender categories—the only categories whose membership we 
actually did convey via labels—were consistently the weakest basis for inductive generalizations. 
Nevertheless, given these possibilities, it is important to assess the generality of our results using 
a different measure of essentialism. 
In Study 5 we sought to examine essentialist thinking about social categories in Northern 
Ireland using an entirely different measure. To do so, we used a modified version of the 
Essentialism Components Questionnaire, which has previously been used to assess essentialist 
beliefs in children as young as five (Deeb et al., 2010; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009). Specifically, 
we used items designed to examine the degree to which children view social categories as 
distinct from each other (i.e., having strong and well-defined boundaries), and stable (i.e., 
resistance to change). Both of these measures can be thought of as indices of category 
naturalness rather than of category coherence (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000). To the extent that this 
measure corroborates the results reported above—that older children show more evidence of 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories than younger children, and that such beliefs are most 
pronounced amongst those attending segregated schools—it becomes less likely that our 
inference results are due to methodological artefacts.  




Participants. 94 children were recruited from Catholic maintained and integrated 
primary schools in Northern Ireland.  As may be seen in Table 5 where we present demographic 
information about our sample, Ns for each age group in each school type varied between 15 and 
16. These Ns are comparable to those in previous developmental studies involving the 
Essentialism Components Questionnaire (e.g. Diesendruck and Haber, 2009).Written parental 
consent was given for every child who participated.    
Materials and Procedure. Each participant was tested for 10 minutes in a quiet area of 
their school/classroom.  Participants were asked a series of questions about religion, gender, and 
pet ownership categories. Questions were blocked by dimension, and at the start of each block 
participants were shown two hand drawn pictures, similar to those used in Studies 2 and 3, and 
told that each depicted a member of one or other of the social categories assessed by the 
subsequent questions.  For each target dimension, five questions were designed to assess the 
extent to which participants viewed social categories as distinct and two to assess the extent to 
which category membership was viewed as stable. All five distinctiveness questions and one 
stability question were taken from Diesendruck and Haber’s (2009) Essentialism Components 
Questionnaire. The distinctiveness questions concerned the extent to which members of named 
social categories (e.g. Catholic and Protestant) are different in what they like, how they behave, 
how they look, what they have inside their body and what they think. The stability questions 
asked about the possibility of changing one’s membership from one category to another and 
whether one can belong to both categories at once.  
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 We counterbalanced the order in which the three social dimensions were presented, and 
within blocks participants answered all of the distinctiveness questions before they answered 
questions about stability. Distinctiveness questions were asked in one of six different orders and 
the order of the two stability questions was counterbalanced. Distinctiveness questions were 
phrased “How much are Catholic children and Protestant children different in…” and 
malleability questions were phrased “How possible is it for a child who owns a goldfish to swap 
it for a hamster?” Children answered all questions on a visual analogue scale with four response 
options. Each response option depicted a stick figure the position of whose arms corresponded to 
the labels “not at all”, “a little”, “a lot”, or “completely”. For example, in the picture illustrating 
the “not at all” response option, the stick figure’s arms rested together on a surface, whereas in 
the picture illustrating the “completely” response option, the arms were aloft and held as wide 
apart as possible.   
Results 
Exploratory Factor Analyses. We entered children’s responses into three separate factor 
analyses—one for each social dimension.  All three analyses employed varimax rotation and a 
principal components extraction method. Factor solutions for religion and pet ownership were 
identical, producing two factors with eigenvalues above 1. The first factor, distinctiveness, 
consisted of responses to the distinctiveness questions, and the second factor, stability, of 
responses to the stability questions. For religion, the first factor accounted for 34% of the 
variance, and the second for 17% of the variance (for rotated factor loadings, see Table 6). For 
pet ownership, the factors accounted for 33% and 19% of the variance, respectively. The initial 
factor analysis of gender resulted in three factors with eigenvalues greater than 1. To enable 
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between-dimension comparisons we limited the solution to two factors. The first factor, 
distinctiveness, accounted for 30% of the variance and the second, stability, for 23% of the 
variance. 
 Based on the factor analyses, we used the raw scores to calculate each child’s perceived 
distinctiveness and stability scores by averaging their responses for each set of items. Stability 
scores were derived from reverse-scored stability questions so that higher scores represented 
more essentialist (i.e., less malleable, or more stable) responses. These scores were analysed 
separately via 3 (Age Group) x 2 (School) x 3 (Dimension) ANOVAs with repeated measures on 
the last factor. 
Category Distinctiveness. Overall, children believed that gender categories (M=2.73) 
were more distinct than religion (M=2.39) or pet ownership (M=2.44) categories, which did not 
differ, F(2, 176) = 17.99, p < .001, � η2partial = .17, Bonferroni-corrected t-test p<0.001. 
However, as may be seen in Figure 10, these differences emerged over development (Age Group 
x Dimension interaction: F(4, 176) = 4.45, p = .002, � η2partial = .09). To explore this interaction, 
we conducted three 2 (School) x 3 (Dimension) ANOVAS. These showed increasing 
differentiation between dimensions with age: 6-year-olds did not distinguish among the 
dimensions with respect to distinctiveness (F(2, 60) = 0.76, p= 0.472, � η2partial = .02), whereas 
for 8-year-olds, gender categories were more distinctive than religion categories (although 
neither differed from pet ownership categories), F(2,56) = 4.64, p < .02, � η2partial = .14, and for 
10-year-olds, gender categories were seen as more distinct than religion or pet ownership 
categories, which did not differ (F(2,60) = 29.34, p < .001, � η2partial = .49.  
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 Category Stability. Overall, children believed that gender categories (M=3.16) were 
more stable than religion categories (M=2.77) which were more stable than pet ownership 
categories (M=2.36), F(2, 176) = 20.86, p < .001, � η2partial = .19, Bonferroni-corrected t-tests 
p≤0.003. However, this was qualified by a significant interaction with Age Group, F(3.6, 158.8) 
= 7.2, p < .001, � η2partial = .14 (see Figure 11A), and a marginally significant interaction with 
School, F(1.8, 158.8) = 2.76, p < .08, η2partial = .03 (see Figure 11B). To explore these 
interactions, we conducted three 2 (School) x 3 (Dimension) ANOVAS. These again showed 
increasing differentiation between dimensions with age. Six-year-olds did not distinguish among 
the dimensions with respect to stability (F(2, 60) = 1.81, p = .17, �η2partial = .06) nor did 8-year-
olds, F(1.5, 42.2) = 2.5, p = .11, �η2partial = .08. In contrast, for 10-year-olds, gender was 
significantly more stable than religion, which was more stable than pet ownership, F(2, 60) = 
67.11, p < .001,� η2partial = .69, Bonferroni-corrected t-tests p<0.001. Moreover, this difference 
was qualified by a significant Dimension x School interaction, F(2, 60) = 8.45, p = .001, �η2partial 
= .22. Bonferroni-corrected t-tests on the means involved in the interaction revealed that for all 
10-year-olds, membership in gender categories was more stable than membership in religion or 
pet ownership categories (p ≤ .008). However, for children attending segregated schools, religion 
was seen as more stable than pet ownership (p<0.001), whereas for children attending integrated 
schools, stability for religion and pet ownership categories did not differ (p=0.217).  
Discussion 
The results of this study are important for two reasons. First, they provide additional 
support - using an entirely different method - for the claim that essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories are relatively late-emerging in Northern Irish children, and are more likely to emerge 
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in those attending segregated rather than integrated schools. Whereas 10-11 year olds attending 
segregated schools perceived religion category membership to be significantly more stable than 
control category membership, 10-11 year olds attending integrated schools did not distinguish 
between the stability of religion and control categories. This supports the findings of studies 1-3 
and makes it unlikely that differences in the developmental pattern seen by us in Northern 
Ireland and by Diesendruck and colleagues in Israel stem from methodological issues.  
Second, these results address the surprising lack of gender-based inferences in Studies 1-
4. In those studies, children consistently made more inferences based on pet ownership 
categories—chosen as a control because we did not expect them to be essentialised—than gender 
categories. We argued above that this finding (see also Diesendruck and HaLevi, 2006; Taylor & 
Gelman, 1993), coupled with evidence that children perceive gender categories to be highly 
natural (e.g., Taylor, 1996; Taylor, Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), is consistent with Haslam et al.’s 
(2000) analysis of social essentialism into components of naturalness and cohesiveness. Haslam 
et al. (2000) have demonstrated that adults’ essentialist beliefs factor into two orthogonal 
dimensions: naturalness and cohesiveness (“entitativity;” see also Rangel & Keller, 2011). The 
naturalness dimension includes beliefs about the extent to which any social category is ‘real’ 
rather than conventional, heritable, and stable over time despite environmental influences. The 
cohesiveness dimension refers to beliefs about the extent to which category members are 
homogeneous and share an underlying similarity that is predictive of further observable or 
hidden properties. Results of Study 5 demonstrate that children in Northern Ireland do indeed 
hold essentialist beliefs about gender categories. Specifically, gender categories were clearly 
perceived to be more stable and more distinct than religion or pet ownership categories. Taken 
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together with the results of Studies 1-4, these findings suggest that children may essentialize 
gender categories with respect to naturalness more so than with respect to cohesiveness. More 
generally, these results also emphasize the importance of analysing the development of 
essentialist thinking in terms of distinct components (Haslam et al., 2000). 
Although gender categories were essentialised in terms of beliefs about distinctiveness 
and stability, religion categories were essentialised in terms of stability only. We are unsure why 
this pattern emerged. One interpretative difficulty lies in relating the concept of distinctiveness to 
Haslam et al’s two-factor structure. Indeed, previous work using the ECQ links distinctiveness 
items both to the sharpness of boundaries between categories (Diesendruck & Haber, 2009) 
which is an element of naturalness, and to category uniformity and informativenesss (Deeb et al., 
2011), which is an element of coherence. In our view, distinctiveness relates to discrete 
boundaries between categories rather than to category uniformity. In particular, the 
distinctiveness questions ask about differences between members of different categories rather 
than the similarities between members of the same category which might underlie belielfs about 
informativeness. Another issue with the distinctiveness dimension is that close inspection of 
factor loadings across the different studies in the literature reveals that individual distinctiveness 
items have been found to load onto different dimensions. Perhaps the safest interpretation of our 
findings across all five studies is that they suggest that gender categories are essentialised along 
the naturalness but not the coherence dimension, whereas religion is essentialised along the 
coherence dimension and along some, but not all, elements of the naturalness dimension. Why 
the different elements of the naturalness distinction might be dissociated for religion categories 
will be a question for future research. 




Overall, results consistently suggest that essentialist beliefs about religion develop 
relatively late among children in Northern Ireland. Results also suggest effects of school context-
-that essentialist thinking about religion categories is predominantly observed among children 
attending segregated schools--but evidence from individual studies is less consistent. In order to 
examine this potential context effect with more power, we carried out meta-analyses on the 
results of Studies 1, 2, 3 and 5, using participating schools as the unit of analysis. An advantage 
of this data analytic strategy is that it also allowed us to examine the effect of community 
diversity on our measures of essentialist reasoning and beliefs.  
Effects of School Type on Essentialist Reasoning 
A total of 20 schools participated in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5. Six of the participating schools 
were integrated and 14 segregated. To conduct the meta-analysis, for each participating school 
we entered the mean difference (and associated standard error) between religion and pet 
ownership scores on the measure of essentialism administered to participating children 
(difference between religion inferences and chance responding on the trials placing religion and 
control category memberships into conflict in Study 1; difference between religion and pet 
ownership inferences in Studies 2-3 and religion and pet ownership essentialism scores in Study 
5) into the Comprehensive Meta-analysis software package (Bornstein, Hedges, Higgins & 
Rothstein, 2009). Results of the analysis are presented in Table 7. Mixed effect meta-analysis 
with schools grouped by type, revealed that overall, essentialist reasoning was more evident for 
religion categories than control categories (std mean difference = .27, SE = .05, 95% CI = [.19, 
.36], Z(20) = 6.02, p <.001). Importantly, this category effect was highly significant for 
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segregated schools (std mean difference = .30, SE = .05, 95% CI = [.20, .40], Z(14) = 6.00, p 
<.001). In contrast, the effect fell short of significance for integrated schools (std mean 
difference = .15, SE = .11, 95% CI = [-.07, .37], Z(6) = 1.34, p = .18), although a test for 
hetereogeneity between school types was non-significant, Q(1) = 1.56, p = .21. This reinforces 
the pattern of results across our experimental studies: religion categories were preferentially 
essentialised among children attending segregated schools, but not among children attending 
integrated schools. 
Effects of Community Diversity on Essentialist Reasoning 
An alternative explanation for the effect of school type on essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories is that perhaps integrated schools tend to be in more integrated neighborhoods 
than segregated schools, and the diversity of the neighborhood, rather than the diversity of the 
educational setting, is really driving the differences in essentialist thinking. To examine the 
relationship between community diversity and essentialist thinking about religion categories, we 
used census data (Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service, 2012) to estimate the 
absolute difference between the proportion of Protestants and Catholics in the electoral ward 
where each of the participating schools was located. Electoral wards in Northern Ireland range in 
size from approximately 1000 to 9000 inhabitants. Because we did not ask participants for their 
addresses, we cannot be sure that they lived in the electoral ward where the school was located. 
However, proximity to the school is a selection criterion for many Northern Irish schools, so 
primary school children in Northern Ireland tend to go to a nearby school. Thus, a measure of 
local community homogeneity based on school location is likely to be a good measure of the 
degree to which participating children’s local communities are diverse.  
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In principle, community diversity scores could range from 0 (equal proportions of 
Catholic and Protestants in the Ward) to 100 (the ward is entirely Catholic or Protestant); in 
practice, scores ranged from 0.05 to 86.4. The average diversity scores were 29.0 (S.D. = 20.27) 
for wards in which integrated schools were located, and 43.2 (S.D. = 26.41) for wards in which 
segregated schools were located. Although this difference was not statistically significant, t(19) = 
1.17, p = .26, d = .60, the size and direction of the effect suggests that integrated schools tend to 
be located in more diverse communities. Accordingly, it is important to assess in a meta-analysis 
whether local community diversity offers a plausible alternative account of the effects of 
educational diversity we have observed. 
If community diversity does explain our results, we would expect the highest degrees of 
essentialist thinking among children attending schools in the least diverse neighbourhoods. To 
examine this possibility, we carried out a meta-regression analysis to test whether community 
diversity predicted effect size across our schools and studies.  The results in Table 8 suggest that 
community diversity is unrelated to children’s tendency to essentialise religion categories 
(regression coefficient = 0.002). Figure 12 clearly illustrates that the measure of community 
diversity does not predict the size of the category effect, suggesting that the differences between 
integrated and segregated schools observed in our studies are not attributable to differential 
diversity of the communities surrounding the schools.  
General Discussion 
Our purpose was to carry out a case study of the development of children’s essentialist thinking 
about religion categories in Northern Ireland. Results paint a consistent picture of the 
development of essentialist thinking among Northern Irish children, and one that differs 
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considerably from our expectations. In Study 1, using a forced choice task, we found that 6-year-
olds did not discriminate between the inductive potency of religion and control category 
membership, but that 8- and 10-year-old children did so. In Study 2 we employed a method 
which permitted children to base individual inferences on membership of more than one 
category, and found that they did not regard religion category membership as a better basis for 
social inference than membership in a control category until 10 years of age. The results of Study 
3 suggested that children distinguish between religion and control category memberships at eight 
years. As the willingness to base inferences about individuals on the basis of their category 
membership depends on beliefs about category cohesiveness, these results strongly suggest that 
children in Northern Ireland come to privilege religion categories to guide inferences about novel 
properties, but that such essentialist reasoning about religion categories in Northern Ireland is 
relatively late-emerging, and is not observed until (at least) eight years of age. The results of 
Study 5, in which we directly measured essentialist beliefs about social categories, showed that 
children do not rate religion categories more stable than control categories until 10 years of age. 
Obtained using an entirely different method, this finding confirms our conclusions about the 
timing of the emergence of essentialist reasoning and beliefs about religion categories amongst 
Northern Irish children.    
 Our results also revealed differences in the essentialist reasoning of Northern Irish 
children educated in integrated and segregated schools. In Study 1 we found that children 
educated in segregated Catholic maintained or State controlled (Protestant) schools perceived 
religion categories to be more inductively potent than control categories by age 8, whereas 
children educated in integrated schools did not differentiate among social dimensions with 
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respect to inductive potential even at age 10. Similar results were obtained in Study 2. Although 
the results of Study 3 did not replicate this pattern, the tendency to believe membership of 
religion categories to be more stable then membership of control categories was only observed in 
10 year olds attending segregated schools in Study 5. Thus, the overall picture that emerges is of 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories emerging predominantly in children attending 
religiously segregated schools. The majority of children in our studies who attended integrated 
schools showed no evidence of more essentialist reasoning about religion categories than about 
control categories. These conclusions were confirmed by the results of a meta-analysis across the 
results from all participating schools in Northern Ireland, which also ruled out neighborhood 
diversity as an alternative explanation for this finding. Thus, in Northern Ireland, selective 
essentialist thinking about religion categories emerges among children attending religiously 
segregated schools, but not among children attending religiously integrated schools. 
 The results of Study 4 showed, as expected, that children in the US do not appear to 
engage in more essentialist reasoning about religion categories than other social categories. In 
fact, the pattern we observed amongst children from the US in Study 4 was, in many respects, the 
reverse of the pattern observed in Northern Irish children in Study 1. Northern Irish children 
showed no evidence of essentialist reasoning until eight years of age, whereas children in the US 
showed evidence of essentialist reasoning at age six—perhaps due to category novelty—but no 
evidence of essentialist reasoning at eight or 10 years of age. This is consistent with the idea that 
the developmental pattern regarding essentialist reasoning about religion categories we observed 
in Northern Ireland may be specific to the particular historical, political, and cultural context of 
Northern Ireland.   
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Comparing Northern Ireland and Israel 
We sought to generate a Northern Irish case study of the development of essentialist 
reasoning about religion categories in part to complement the research program of Diesendruck 
and colleagues on the development of essentialist thinking about ethnicity categories in Israel 
(e.g. Birnbaum et al., 2010, Diensendruck & HaLevi, 2006). It is important to point out that there 
are multiple important differences between the Northern Irish and Israeli case studies, and as 
earlier discussion of our methodological choices will have made apparent, our intention was not 
to replicate the Israeli studies in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, a qualitative comparison of 
overall developmental patterns in the two cases is highly informative; it reveals striking parallels 
as well as important differences in development of essentialist thinking in the two contexts, and 
raises generative questions for future study.  
First, like the Israeli data, our studies show that children growing up in a society with a 
history of conflict between social groups are especially likely to essentialise the categories which 
are the basis of that conflict. This was evident both within and between cultures. Within cultures, 
children in Northern Ireland were more essentialist about religion categories than control 
categories (Studies 1-3 & 5), whereas children in Israel were more essentialist about ethnicity 
categories than other categories (e.g. Birnbaum et al., 2010, Diensendruck & HaLevi, 2006). 
Between cultures, children in Northern Ireland reasoned differently about religion categories 
than children in the US (Study 4), and children in Israel reason differently about ethnicity 
categories than children in the US (Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013). Thus, in both 
Israel and Northern Ireland, we see differential essentialist thinking about culturally salient social 
categories. 
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Despite differences between the integrated sectors in Israel and Northern Ireland 
(Bekerman, Zembylas & McGlynn, 2009), a second important similarity between Northern 
Ireland and Israel concerns the different developmental trajectories of essentialist reasoning 
among children in segregated versus integrated educational contexts.  Children attending 
integrated schools in Northern Ireland show evidence of attenuated essentialist reasoning 
(Studies 1 and 2) and beliefs (Study 5) about religion categories relative to children attending 
segregated schools. Likewise, children attending integrated schools in Israel show evidence of 
attenuated essentialist beliefs about ethnicity categories relative to children attending segregated 
schools (Deeb et al., 2011). Thus, both case studies contain important findings relating to the 
effects of historical-cultural context and associations with educational diversity on how and 
whether essentialist reasoning about socially relevant categories is manifested.    
Similarities notwithstanding, our data suggest that in important respects, development of 
essentialist thinking about social categories differs in Northern Ireland and Israel. First, none of 
the Northern Irish children included in our studies appeared to develop essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories until eight years of age, whereas studies consistently show that some Israeli 
children as young as five years of age show evidence of essentialist reasoning about ethnicity 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013; Diesendruck & HaLevi, 2006; 
Segall et al., 2015). Importantly, the pattern that emerged in Northern Irish children’s category-
based reasoning (Studies 1-3) was confirmed in a  study using a very different, and perhaps more 
direct, measure of essentialist beliefs (Study 5), suggesting that this difference is unlikely to be a 
methodological artifact. There are several reasons why essentialist reasoning about ethnicity 
categories in Israel may emerge earlier than essentialist reasoning about religion categories in 
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Northern Ireland. First, visual and linguistic cues to ethnic category membership in Israel may 
make membership of such categories much more salient or outwardly obvious than cues to 
membership in religion categories in Northern Ireland; some theorists hold visual cues to be 
extremely important to social category essentialism (e.g. Gil-White, 2001). It is conceivable that 
because visual cues to religion category membership in Northern Ireland are less readily 
observable, children become aware of the importance of religion categories later in Northern 
Ireland than is the case for ethnicity categories in Israel. If so, attendance at a segregated school 
may be an important component of children’s developing awareness of religion categories in 
Northern Ireland.  
Another explanation for later emergence of social essentialist thinking in Northern 
Ireland involves differences in the timing of relevant input. Specifically, since the signing of the 
Good Friday Peace Accords in 1998 (and hence for the entire lifetime of the children in these 
studies), Northern Ireland has been a “post-conflict” society (e.g. Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & 
Cairns, 2009). As such, parents in Northern Ireland might be less likely to speak of religion 
categories in ways that might promote essentialist thinking—such as using generic reference 
(e.g., Gelman, Ware & Kleinberg, 2010). If so, perhaps essentialist reasoning about religion 
categories in Northern Ireland does not develop until children are taught the societal importance 
of such categories from some other source, such as attendance at a segregated school. In contrast, 
the conflict between Arabs and Jews in Israel is, as yet, unresolved, a situation which may result 
in more parental talk—including generic language—about relevant social categories. If so, the 
earlier input in Israel may lead to an earlier emergence of essentialist thinking about culturally 
relevant social categories (see Segall et al., 2015). Although clearly beyond the scope of this 
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paper, identifying the causes of the differences in developmental trajectory of essentialist 
thinking about critical social categories in Northern Ireland and Israel is an important area for 
further investigation. 
Although, as mentioned above, differences between children in segregated and integrated 
schools are evident in both Northern Ireland and Israel, a second important difference between 
the Northern Irish and the Israeli results is the precise nature of the school differences in the two 
contexts. To put it simply, in Northern Ireland, attending segregated schools is associated with an 
increase in essentialist thinking, whereas in Israel, attending integrated schools is associated with 
a decrease in essentialist thinking. One account that might explain both patterns is that the 
different effects represent interactions between school context and societal defaults with respect 
to integration of members of salient social categories.2 As we have pointed out previously, 
Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland tend to live in the same communities, and 
segregation tends to be on the micro level of neighborhoods rather than the macro level of towns 
or sectors (Lloyd & Shuttleworth, 2011). As such, segregated schools—albeit the norm—reflect 
a departure from the demographic default of a relatively integrated society. Accordingly, we 
observe the most marked effects on essentialist thinking among children attending segregated 
schools in Northern Ireland. In contrast, in Israel, Jews and Arabs typically live in different 
communities and even different parts of the country, and therefore segregation tends to be on the 
macro level (for a recent study of the segregation of Arabs in Israel, see Schnell, Abu Baker Diab 
& Benenson, 2015). As such, integrated schools reflect a departure from the demographic default 
of a relatively divided society. Accordingly, the most marked effects on essentialist thinking 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
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reported by Diesendruck and colleagues is among children in integrated schools. This is a 
potentially important hypothesis which deserves further empirical attention. Importantly, only by 
presenting a detailed case study of the development of essentialist thinking about social 
categories in a new and different historical, political, and cultural context—Northern Ireland—to 
be compared and contrasted with what we already know about development in Israel, was this 
hypothesis even brought to light.  
Differences Between Integrated and Segregated Schools in Northern Ireland 
 Why does essentialist reasoning about religion categories emerge much more strongly 
among children attending segregated schools in Northern Ireland?  One possibility, or course, is 
that spending the majority of one’s time with members of one’s own salient social category helps 
to reify that category and causes a marked increase in essentialist thinking. Of course, we cannot 
draw causal conclusions from the present results. Moreover, there are at least two other reasons 
why attendance at segregated school might be associated with essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories. First, as the results of our meta-analysis suggests, segregated schools may be located 
in segregated communities, meaning that community segregation rather than educational 
diversity may be the causally important factor. However, we observed almost no statistical 
relationship between a measure of diversity in the communities where participating schools were 
located, and levels of essentialist thinking about religion categories in those schools. This finding 
strongly suggests that the different levels of essentialist thinking associated with educational 
environment observed in our studies are not due to community segregation. 
An alternative account of the associations with educational environment is that they are 
driven by parental input. As parents choose the primary school attended by their child, the school 
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chosen may be an indicator of the political attitudes to which the child is exposed at home, which 
may be the critical component in the development of essentialist thinking (see Degner & Dalege, 
2013). Indeed, it has recently been argued that essentialism in Israel is caused more by parental 
language than by choice of school environment, which turns out to be predicted by parental 
attitudes (see Segall et al., 2015). This implies that a segregated school environment per se may 
play little role in the development of essentialist beliefs about ethnicity categories amongst 
Israeli children. 
Morgan, Dunn, Cairns and Fraser (1993) found that five major factors contributed to 
parents in Northern Ireland choosing to send their children to integrated schools. One of these 
was indeed political ideology, but others included educational quality, dissatisfaction with their 
current school, convenience, and mixed marriage. This suggests that deciding whether to send a 
child to an integrated school in Northern Ireland can be a complex and multifaceted decision, and 
is unlikely to be based solely on political or intergroup attitudes. Clearly, further work will be 
required to tease apart the relative importance of parental input and school environment in the 
development of essentialist beliefs about religion categories in Northern Ireland. 
Future Directions 
Our findings highlight a number of important avenues for future investigation. As 
discussed above, identifying the mechanisms responsible for the different developmental 
trajectories among children in segregated versus integrated schools is one important area for 
further study. Another important avenue for future research hinted at above will be examining 
the role played by parental linguistic input in the development of Northern Irish children’s 
beliefs about religion categories. Adult use of generic language (e.g, “Hamster owners are 
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habitually tardy.”) appears to be an important determinant of essentialist thinking in young 
children (e.g., Rhodes, Leslie & Tworek, 2012; Segall et al., 2015). As such it will be important 
to investigate the frequency with which parents in Northern Ireland use generic language to refer 
to social categories, and the age at which such use is observed.   
Another important direction for future research will be to explore the underlying structure 
of social essentialism across a range of categories and cultural contexts. As described above, 
Haslam et al. (2000) have demonstrated that adults’ essentialist beliefs embody the components 
of naturalness and cohesiveness. However, most studies of the development of essentialist 
thinking utilize a single measure of such thinking. Future studies using multiple measures of 
essentialist reasoning such as the category naturalness task (Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 
2013; Rhodes and Gelman, 2009), the switched at birth task (e.g. Gelman & Wellman, 1991; 
Taylor, Rhodes and Gelman, 2009) and the category stability task (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012) may 
reveal a more complex and nuanced view of the development of essentialist thinking about social 
categories, because different tasks may tap into different dimensions of essentialist beliefs. For 
example, a switched at birth task may tap into beliefs about naturalness whereas the inference 
task may tap into the cohesiveness dimension of essentialism. Indeed, as argued above, our 
results support just such a view of gender categories, which children may perceive as relatively 
high in naturalness but relative low in cohesiveness. 
 A final important avenue for research will be to map out the continuing trajectory of 
essentialist beliefs about social categories into adolescence and adulthood in Northern Ireland. 
Unlike work suggesting a decrease in essentialist thinking in later childhood (e.g., Deeb et al., 
2011; Taylor et al., 2009; but see Eidson & Coley, 2014), our results show little evidence of 
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decreasing essentialist thinking. Other work appears to demonstrate an important role for context 
in determining whether the tendency to hold essentialist beliefs about particular social categories 
increases or decreases in adolescence (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). As such, it becomes critical to 
characterize the entire developmental spectrum—including adults—in order to understand the 
role of context and experience in the development of essentialist thinking about social categories 
in general and conflict-relevant culturally salient social categories in particular (see Coley, 2000). 
Conclusions 
We have shown that children in Northern Ireland come to see religion categories like 
Catholic and Protestant as potent guides for inductive inferences in a way that children in the US 
do not. This tendency emerges by age 8, and is especially evident among children in relatively 
homogeneous educational settings. When compared with the development of essentialist thinking 
about ethnicity categories (Arab, Jew) in Israel, these results highlight potentially universal 
aspects of essentialist thinking about social kinds. They reinforce the unique cognitive status of 
culturally salient social categories—especially those related to historical and cultural conflict—as 
well as the potential role of inter-group contact in attenuating essentialist thinking. They also 
highlight differences in the two cases, and raise questions about the differential developmental 
trajectories of essentialist thinking among children growing up in different historical, cultural, 
and political contexts, as well as in the precise mechanism by which context might influence 
conceptualization of social kinds. Although answering these questions will be a matter for future 
research, without a detailed look at the development of essentialist thinking about social kinds in 
a different cultural and historical context, the questions themselves might have remained 
undiscovered. 
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Table 1. Demographic information on participants in Study 1 
School Type Age Group Religion 
State Controlled 6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 




Not Religious: 29% 
Catholic Maintained 6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 




Not Religious: 2% 
Integrated 6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 




Not Religious: 37% 
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Table 2: Demographic information on participants in Study 2. 
School Type Age Group Religion 
State Controlled 6-7 years old: N=18 
8-9 years old: N=20 




Not Religious: 3.5% 
Catholic Maintained 6-7 years old: N=17 
8-9 years old: N=21 




Not Religious: 2% 
Integrated 6-7 years old: N=18 
8-9 years old: N=19 




Not Religious: 33% 
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Table 3. Demographic information on participants in Study 3 
School Type Age Group Religion 
State Controlled 6-7 years old: N=20 
8-9 years old: N=26 




Not Religious: 4% 
Catholic Maintained 6-7 years old: N=27 
8-9 years old: N=28 




Not Religious: 2.5% 
Integrated 6-7 years old: N=26 
8-9 years old: N=24 












Table 4: Mean inferences based on religion, gender, and control categories for US children.  
Note that chance = 2/4, +p<.10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Age Group Social Dimension Mean 
   Religion Pet Ownership (Control) Gender 
6-yr-olds 2.83 (1.09)*** 2.80 (1.06)*** 2.10 (1.03) 2.58  (0.88)*** 
8-yr-olds 2.56 (1.20)+ 2.56 (1.15)+ 2.06 (1.16) 2.39 (1.00) 
10-yr-olds 2.37 (1.38) 2.00 (1.11) 1.84 (1.07) 2.07 (0.92) 
Mean 2.63 (1.20)*** 2.51 (1.13)*** 2.01 (1.07)  
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Table 5: Demographic information on participants in Study 5. 
  
School Type Age Group Religion 
Catholic Maintained 6-7 years old: N = 16 
8-9 years old: N = 15 




Not Religious: 2% 
Integrated 6-7 years old: N = 16 
8-9 years old: N = 15 




Not Religious: 13% 
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Table 6: Factor loading of each dimension from the Essentialism Components Questionnaire.   
Question Religion Gender Pet Ownership 
Distinctive Stable Distinctive Stable Distinctive Stable 
1. What they like 
 
.70 -.33 .72 .03 .70 .09 
2. How they behave 
 
.53 -.42 .49 .12 .68 -.01 
3. How they look 
 
.65 -.01 .77 -.21 .64 -.11 
4. What they have inside their 
body 
 
.66 -.009 .44 .008 .74 .11 
5. What they think 
 
.74 .09 .72 -.03 .62 -.14 
6. Possibility of category 
change  
 
.16 .77 -.002 .88 -.15 .82 
7. Possibility of joint 
membership 
 
-.16 .65 .004 .91 .10 .79 
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Table 7. Meta analytic effects of category (religion vs. control) in each of the schools, and community 













Integrated 1 (a) -0.20 0.21 [-0.61, 0.22] -0.94 0.349 
 1 (b) 0.34 0.17 [0.00, 0.67] 1.96 0.050 
 2 (c) -0.05 0.13 [-0.31, 0.22] -0.36 0.721 
 3 (d) 0.57 0.16 [0.26, 0.87] 3.64 >0.001 
 3 (e) 0.07 0.19 [-0.31, 0.44] 0.35 0.729 
 5 (f) 0.11 0.15 [-0.17, 0.40] 0.77 0.44 
Category Effect,  
Integrated Sector  0.15 0.11 [-0.07, 0.37] 1.34 0.18 
Segregated 1 (g) 0.87 0.44 [-0.00, 1.74] 1.96 0.051 
 1 (h) 0.24 0.16 [-0.08, 0.55] 1.45 0.15 
 1 (i) 0.30 0.14 [0.02, 0.58] 2.12 0.034 
 1 (j) 0.72 0.27 [0.18, 1.25] 2.64 0.008 
 2 (k) 0.84 0.34 [0.18, 1.50] 2.50 0.012 
 2 (l) 0.06 0.15 [-0.24, 0.35] 0.38 0.704 
 2 (m) 0.29 0.18 [-0.05, 0.63] 1.65 0.098 
 2 (n) 0.29 0.23 [-0.15, 0.74] 1.29 0.198 
 3 (o) 0.19 0.16 [-0.13, 0.50] 1.15 0.252 
 3 (p) 0.40 0.15 [0.10, 0.71] 2.59 0.009 
 3 (q) 0.51 0.20 [0.12, 0.89] 2.57 0.010 
 3 (r) 0.27 0.16 [-0.05, 0.59] 1.66 0.098 
 5 (s) -0.04 0.26 [-0.47, 0.55] 0.15 0.88 
 5 (t) 0.30 0.18 [-.05, .66] 1.67 0.09 
Category Effect,  
Segregated Sector 0.30 0.05 [0.20, 0.40] 6.00 >0.001 
Category Effect Overall 0.27 0.05 [0.19, 0.36] 6.02 >0.001 




Table 8. Results of meta-regression predicting essentialist reasoning about religion categories 










95% Confidence  
Interval Z-value p 
Intercept 0.19 0.10 [-0.001, 0.380] 1.95 0.051 
Community Diversity 0.002 0.002 [-0.002, 0.006] 0.82 0.500 






Figure 1: A sample triad from Experiment 1 which forced children to choose between control 
and religion category membership as a basis for social inference. 
 
Target picture. ‘This child here goes to a Catholic Church like this child (points to 
test picture 1), and owns a goldfish like this child (points to test picture 2).  Do you 
think this child is ‘flirst’ like this child here (points to test picture 1) or ‘legan’ like 
this child here (points to test picture 2)?
Base picture 1.  ‘This child here goes to 
a Catholic Church and owns a hamster.  
This child here is flirst.’
Base picture 2. ‘This child here goes 
to a Protestant Church and owns a 
goldfish.  This child here is legan’.















































(A) Religion v Control Trials
6-yr-olds 8-yr-olds 10-yr-olds




Figure 2: Inferences (out of 4), broken down by School Type and Age, for each pairing of 
dimensions in Study 2. (A) Religion-based inferences for religion v control trials. (B) Religion-
base inferences for religion v gender trials. (C) Gender-based inferences for gender v control 





















(C) Gender v Control Trials
6-yr-olds 8-yr-olds 10-yr-olds




Figure 3:  Mean number of religion-based inferences (out of a maximum of eight) made by 











































Figure 4: Sample set of base and target pictures for religion/gender trials in Study 2. Note that 
each target picture is labeled by its relationship to the base. For example, R+G+ shares religion 
and gender category membership with the base whereas the R-G- target child shares membership 
of neither category.  
Base. “Look at this child. This 
child is a boy and goes to a 
Protestant church.  This child is 
sproice”. 
R+/G+ Target. “Look at this child. 
This child is a boy and goes to a 
Protestant church. Do you think 
this child is sproice like this one 
(points to base)? 
R+/G- Target. “Look at this 
child.  This child is a girl and 
goes to a Protestant church. Do 
you think this child is sproice 
like this one?  
R-/G+ Target. “Look at this child. 
This child is a boy and goes to a 
Catholic church. Do you think this 
child is sproice like this one? 
R-/G- Target. “Look at this child. 
This child is a girl and goes to a 
Catholic church. Do you think 
this child is sproice like this one? 





Figure 5: Mean number of inferences (out of a maximum of four) based on religion, pet 
ownership, and gender, for children in state controlled, catholic maintained, and integrated school 
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Figure 6: Mean number of inferences (out of a maximum of four) based on religion, pet 


















Religion Pet Ownership Gender




Figure 7: Mean difference score (number of religion-based inferences minus number of pet-based 
















































Figure 8: Sample set of base and target pictures for religion/gender trials in Study 3. Note that 
each target picture is labeled by its relationship to the base. For example, R+G+ shares religion 
and gender category membership with the base whereas the R-G- target child shares membership 
of neither category. 
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 Figure 9: Mean number of inferences (out of a maximum of four) based on religion, pet 
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Figure 10: Mean distinctiveness score for religion, pet ownership, and gender categories for 6, 8, 
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 Figure 11: (A) Mean stability score for religion, pet pet ownership, and gender categories for 6, 
8, and 10-year-old age groups in Study 5. (B) Mean stability scores by social dimension for 10-














(B) Stability: School x Dimension, 10-year-olds only


















(A) Stability: Age x Dimension
Religion Pet Ownership Gender




Figure 12: Scatterplot showing relationship between the diversity of the community in which 
each participating school was located and the standardized difference between the means for 
religion and control categories. 
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